Wiener Stadtgespräch: “Welche Grenzen brauchen wir? Eine humane Migrations- und Asylpolitik ist möglich”

I was invited to speak about my book “What borders do we need?”, available in German at www.grenzen.eu. A humane migration and asylum policy is possible!

We need to leave behind metaphors from hydraulics in our thinking about borders and migration. The sooner we do this, the sooner will we get to a solution-oriented debate. The distinction between regular and irregular migration, and between humane and inhumane borders, is central to this.

Der Spiegel Title story on “the right refugee policy for Europe”

Spiegel Migration

Der Spiegel wrote a very good title story this week (25 August) on the right refugee policy for the EU, which Germany should push for. A coherent plan that could get majority support – and be presented as alternative to Nauru fantasies / push-back proposals of Salvini, Orban and co. The key recommendations in this article:

1. More assistance to countries close to crises hosting many refugees, and to UNHCR.

2. Control external borders to know who enters; identify and register those who do.

3. More resettlement: more ways for refugees and those who are politically persecuted to find their way to Europe legally.

4. Rescues: Europe has a duty to rescue those at risk of drowning. This should not be left to private organisations.

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5. European transit centres: there European experts should be able to determine within a few weeks whether somebody needs asylum; those who do not should not remain in Europe.

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6. Agreements on return: negotiate new types of agreements with African countries of origin for them to be willing to take back their citizens.

7. Contingents: offer annual legal migration contingents in return, so that countries such as Senegal, Gambia or Nigeria are ready to agree to new return agreements.

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8. Those who arrived in Germany before a set date should be able to acquire residence and work permits. Concentrate deportations on those who pose threats or are criminal.

 

Spiegel - wer darf rein

 

Implementation of a humane policy – start in the Aegean

The challenge is to find the way now to move from ideas to implementation.

One place to start is in the Aegean, right away.  The EU- Turkey agreement is based on these very principles – if it would actually be implemented in full:

– EU provides substantial financial help for refugees in Turkey (1)

– It allows for better control at external (Greek-Turkish) border (2)

– (Voluntary) resettlement of refugees from Turkey to EU  (3)

– Sharp decline in deaths in Aegean; everyone rescued in Greek waters is brought to Greece. (4)

– KEY CHALLENGE on Aegean islands: quick and fair decisions on who needs international protection in the EU and who can be returned to Turkey (or offered voluntary return to country of origin) (5)

– Return: Turkey agrees to take back those who do not need international protection in EU if they arrived in Greece after 20 March 2016 (6)

– Mobility: Turkey is offered visa liberalisation in return for full cooperation (while meeting mutually agreed key conditions set out in visa roadmap) (7)

– Cut-off date: the EU-Turkey statement has a cut-off date for returns to Turkey – those who arrived after March 2018 (8)

IMG_1962

 

Implementation of a humane policy: a place for rescuers to take people in Europe

At the same time there is an urgency to find a better way to deal with those rescued now in the Central Mediterraean , and to do so quickly.  The ESI’s Malta/Rome/Amsterdam/Sanchez Plan for the Mediterranean would achieve this, and also meet all the objectives and respect all the above principles.

 

(Two recommendations in the Spiegel article concern development policies in Africa and job creation programs in refugee camps: both go beyond issues we developed in our proposals).

Gesine Schwan und Gerald Knaus: Vorschlag für eine “europäische Antwort” auf die Flüchtlingsfrage, die sofort umgesetzt werden kann

Gerald Knaus and Gesine Schwan

ESI with EU Commissioner Oettinger at expert workshop: Unblocking the refugee relocation impasse? (15 May 2018)

Kernpunkte dieses Vorschlags sind: eine Koalition von betroffenen Staaten, in denen das Recht auf Asyl noch verteidigt werden soll; transparente und rechtskonforme Beschleunigung von Asylverfahren, schnelle Rückführungen jener, die keinen Schutz in der EU brauchen, freiwillige dezentrale Ansiedlung anerkannter Flüchtlinge und Umsiedlung von Schutzbedürftigen aus der Türkei. Und dadurch konkrete Ergebnisse noch vor dem Europaparlamentswahlen 2019.

  1. Im Format einer „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ vereinbaren Frankreich und Deutschland im Verbund mit den Niederlanden, der Schweiz und Schweden den südeuropäischen Ankunftsländern Griechenland, Italien und Spanien solidarisch bei der Durchführung schneller qualitätsvoller Asylverfahren und der dezentralen Ansiedlung von anerkannten Asylbewerbern sowie bei der Rückführung nicht anerkannter Flüchtlinge zu helfen. Es geht um eine Demonstration von Erfolg, der die gesamte europäische Debatte beeinflussen soll: es ist möglich Kontrolle und Empathie zu verbinden.
  1. Die Asylverfahren sollen in griechischen, italienischen und gegebenenfalls spanischen Hotspots inspiriert vom niederländisch/schweizerischen Vorbild, das Qualität mit Geschwindigkeit verbindet, ablaufen. (Das ist im Einklang mit bestehendem nationalem Recht in diesen Ländern möglich). Durch sofortige Zuordnung von bezahlten Rechtsanwälten zu den Asylsuchenden und von Nichtregierungsorganisationen zu den Verfahren werden Schnelligkeit und Solidität der Verfahren erreicht. Einschließlich Revision brauchen sie dank juristischer Kompetenz und dank hergestellter Transparenz höchstens zwei Wochen bis zu einer Erstinstanz-Entscheidung, und weitere höchstens 6 Wochen bis zu einer Berufungsentscheidung. Personal aus anderen europäischen Ländern soll bei der kompetenten Prüfung der Asylanträge helfen. Die Asylzusage gilt für alle Mitgliedsländer der „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“.
  1. Für die anerkannten Flüchtlinge bieten die genannten Länder sofort eine freiwillige Aufnahme an, wie sie Deutschland aus Griechenland noch im Herbst 2017 durchführte. Zugleich wird ein neues Verfahren freiwilliger dezentraler Aufnahme von anerkannten Flüchtlingen durch die Kommunen und Städte eingerichtet. Kommunen sind eingeladen, auf der Basis beratender Multi-Stakeholder Beiräte (Vertreter der Gemeindeverwaltungen, der Unternehmen und von Nichtregierungsorganisationen, einschließlich, wenn möglich, wissenschaftlicher Beratung) darüber zu entscheiden, ob und in welcher Zahl sie im Rahmen ihrer eigenen weiteren Entwicklung Flüchtlinge aufnehmen wollen. Ihre Angebote schicken sie an die Hotspots, wo die anerkannten Flüchtlinge sich ihrerseits für drei Städte/Kommunen bewerben können. Hierzu muss ein Matching-System eingeführt werden.
  1. In der ersten Phase zahlen die Mitglieder der „Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ in einen Fonds ein, der außerhalb des EU-Haushalts angelegt ist und bei dem die Gemeinden die Erstattung ihrer Integrationskosten beantragen können. Sie erhalten dann für ihre eigene Entwicklung (Wohnungsbau, Infrastruktur, Bildung, Kultur etc.) zusätzlich die gleiche Summe.
  1. Perspektivisch sollte die EU im nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen einen solchen Fonds als „Kommunalen Integrations- und Entwicklungsfonds“ anlegen, der neben der Flüchtlingsintegration zielgenau kommunale Investitionen fördert. Die Mitgliedstaaten beschließen, Flüchtlingen, um die sich Kommunen aus ihrem Hoheitsbereich bewerben, die Einreise zu gestatten. Wenn sie das ablehnen, können ihre Kommunen aus dem Fonds keine Investitionsförderung erhalten.
  1. Jene deren Antrag abgelehnt wird oder bei denen entschieden wird, dass die Türkei für sie ein sicheres Land ist, werden in die Türkei zurückgeführt. Dazu wird eine glaubwürdige Ombudsperson für das Abkommen berufen, die in jedem Einzelfall der Frage der Behandlung jener nachgehen kann, die in die Türkei zurückgeschickt werden. Dazu werden wo möglich freiwillige Rückkehrprogramme in Herkunftsländer und Rückkehrberatung ausgebaut.
  1. Parallel beteiligen sich die Mitglieder der betroffenen Länder verstärkt bei der in der EU-Türkei-Erklärung vorgesehenen Umsiedlung von Schutzbedürftigen aus der Türkei.
  1. Ankara sollte weiters angeboten werden, die EU-Türkei-Erklärung auch auf die Landgrenze mit Griechenland auszudehnen – im Gegenzug könnte die schon versprochene finanzielle Hilfe für Flüchtlinge in der Türkei noch verlängert und aufgestockt werden (das ist im Interesse aller) .

 

Ein realistisches Szenario für Griechenland 2018

Eine realistische Annahme ist, dass im Rahmen einer solchen Initiative die Zahl derjenigen, die aus der Türkei nach Griechenland kommen, zunächst schnell wieder auf das Niveau der ersten Jahreshälfte 2017 fällt (mit etwa 1.500 Ankommenden im Monat), und dann noch niedriger. Wenn 1.000 abgelehnte Asylwerber im Monat in die Türkei zurückgeschickt würden, würde die Zahl der Ankommenden schnell fallen.

Dafür sollten EU-Staaten für jeden in Griechenland von dieser Mission anerkannten Flüchtling (500 im Monat?) einen Flüchtling aus Griechenland aufnehmen, und die Zahl der Umsiedlungen aus der Türkei ausbauen (auf mindestens 2.000 im Monat).  So könnte die EU Griechenland helfen, die unzumutbaren Zustände auf den griechischen Inseln beseitigen, ein Model für schnelle qualitätsvolle Asylverfahren liefern, den Balkan entlasten, und den Druck auf die Grenzen Deutschlands spürbar reduzieren. Und all das im Einklang mit europäischem Recht und ohne Asylsuchende schlecht zu behandeln. Und die Verteilung anerkannter Flüchtlinge könnte zum Ausbau eines auf Freiwilligkeit beruhenden Systems flexibler europäischer Solidarität führen.

 

Mehr über das niederländische Asylverfahren: “Amsterdam in the Mediterranean” – How a Dutch-style asylum system can help resolve the Mediterranean refugee crisis (26 January 2018)

Mehr über den Vorschlag: FAZ, “Niemand sollte jahrelang in der Luft hängen” (23 April 2018)

As Italy votes – by John Dalhuisen and Gerald Knaus

As Italy votes – the case for a humane migration policy that works
John Dalhuisen and Gerald Knaus

“Those making moral calculations must reflect on the fact that the only real alternative – in this imperfect world – is not something better, but something much worse.”

italian-election-2018-explained-everything-you-need-to-know-before-italy-vote-here

Just over a year ago, the Italian government struck a deal with the Libyan authorities to intercept migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean. Following the arrival of half a million refugees and migrants in just three years, the centre-left Democratic Party – the same party that set up the ambitious search and rescue operation, Mare Nostrum, back in 2013 – decided that it had to act. A short Memorandum of Understanding was followed by a string of agreements with Libyan mayors and tribal leaders negotiated – often personally – by Italy’s Minister of Interior, Marco Minniti. The policy had an immediate effect: arrivals in the second half of 2017 were down 70 percent compared to the same period the year before, and deaths at sea declined equally sharply.

Italy’s Libya strategy was backed by the rest of the EU but has been roundly criticised by NGOs and UN agencies for trapping thousands of migrants in a lawless country, in which they risk torture, extortion and slavery, sometimes at the hands of the very groups these agreements were struck with. The Libyan coast guard stands accused of handing over those it intercepts to inhumane detention centres, where abuse is common.

And yet, as Italians head to the polls today one thing looks certain: whichever coalition forms the next government, it is likely to continue the policy of the current minister of the interior, who has become one of the most popular politicians in the country. No political party polling more than a few percent is opposed to the policy. In an election dominated by migration, promising to control borders is a pre-requisite for success.

This sobering reality highlights the true challenge for those who care about the right of refugees and migrants trapped in Libya. It is this: how can one persuade those who will shape Italy’s Mediterranean policy in the coming years that a policy that combines control with empathy, effectiveness with humanity, and reduced irregular migration with human rights is not only possible but also electorally preferable for the next Italian government?

A humane policy must aim for zero deaths at sea. It must ensure that all those rescued by European boats have access to a fair, effective asylum procedure. It must ensure that nobody who is intercepted by the Libyan coast guard ends up in inhumane detention centres. And it must protect those in need of protection from being pushed back into danger in their home countries.

How can these goals be met? The next Italian government should propose to its European partners a realistic plan that includes the following four elements.

First, a common effort is needed to ensure sufficient search and rescue capacity beyond Libya’s territorial waters. In the first six months of 2017 more than 2,500 refugees and migrants drowned. 600 people still drowned in the second half of the year despite the reduction in departures. Instead of demonising NGO rescue boats or leaving it to the Libyan coast guard or the Italian authorities, all European countries should make an even bigger effort.

Second, Western support to the Libyan coast guard and the Libyan authorities should be linked to a clear condition: that anybody intercepted/rescued by its boats and taken back to Libya should be offered immediate evacuation to Niger by IOM. The numbers involved make this possible: in 2017 the Libyan coast guard intercepted less than 1,500 people a month on average. In Niger, those who choose not to apply for asylum should be offered assisted return to their countries of origin via IOM. Those who do should be resettled to a safe country if found to be in need of protection. The same should happen with all those (around 5,000) currently held in Libyan detention centres.

Third, securing European agreements with key African countries of origin for the return of all failed asylum seekers arriving after an agreed date should be a priority. The challenge is to find a humane, legal way of reducing irregular economic migration. This can best be achieved by changing the incentives that currently exist for would be economic migrants. Currently the only disincentives to travelling to Europe are the cost and the risk of the journey. The vast majority of migrants who make it to Italy can be confident that they will be able to stay, whether they are granted international protection or not. Last year 130,000 people applied for asylum in Italy, a majority from West African countries. The same year 12,000 applicants were granted international protection. But (almost) everybody stays in Europe, regardless of their asylum status. One obvious reason for this is the reluctance of countries of origin to cooperate in the identification and return of their citizens. In 2016 more than 100,000 people arrived in Italy from six West African nations; around 4,300 citizens of these countries were granted international protection. And 255 returned, voluntarily or by force. Successive Italian authorities have found it easiest to allow migrants to either move on to other European countries, or integrate, however precariously, into Italy’s thriving black economy. Countries of origins should be offered an annual contingent of regular visas (not just by Italy) for work or study. Such agreements will only work if they are found to be in the interests of countries of origin.

Fourth, seriously discouraging irregular economic migration also requires a quick, but fair, asylum process that should seek to award a protection status or move to deport those found to have no claim within two to three months at most. This need not come at the expense of quality: the Netherlands have one of the best systems in Europe and it consistently delivers informed decisions within this timeframe. It may require keeping most asylum-seekers in closed centres for this duration. It would certainly require the financial and administrative support of other EU countries, which should relocate recognized asylum seekers. This would not be cheap to run, or easy to set up, but as a joint European effort it is doable.

This plan would not end all arrivals in Europe – which is not the goal – but it would sharply reduce numbers – which is. It would create legal channels for refugees and economic migrants. It would reduce deaths at sea and not condemn people to torture in Libyan detention centres. It would guarantee access to asylum for those who do reach Italy and uphold the core principles of the Refugee convention for those who do not.

But would such a “Rome plan” be in the interest of the next Italian government? We believe that it would. Italian politics highlights realities which are true for most of the EU today. Any political party that fails to promise to control borders renders itself unelectable. At the same time there are a lot of voters who care about the right to asylum and do not want to see those who cross borders treated inhumanely. Offering such policies would distinguish mainstream parties, on the left and on the right, from racists on the far-right.

And the human rights community? Many will welcome the commitment to legal paths, but baulk at the prospect of more returns, faster procedures and closed asylum processing centres. But those making moral calculations must reflect on the fact that the only real alternative – in this imperfect world – is not something better, but something much worse. Demagogues are best defeated by demonstrating – with conviction and through effective policies – that a world in which empathy has a central place, is possible.

Such a plan is in Italy’s interest. The EU should back it. So should anyone who cares about human rights in the Mediterranean and about the welfare of those so desperately trying to cross it.

 

John Dalhuisen is ESI Senior Fellow and former director for Europe @ Amnesty International; Gerald Knaus is ESI founding chairman

 

John Dalhuisen

 

Two steps – towards a humane and effective EU asylum policy in the Central Mediterranean (I)

A new ESI report on this is coming early next week – in recent weeks we presented the ideas below at many meetings to policy makers, from Athens to Stockholm, from Berlin to Brussels. 

If Europe’s current refugee and migration crisis has made anything clear over the past two years, it is this: the European Union urgently needs a credible, effective policy on asylum and border management that respects existing international and EU refugee law and controls external land and sea borders. It must treat asylum seekers respectfully while deterring irregular migration and undermining the business model of smugglers; it must save lives and respect the fundamental ethical norm of the rule of rescue, not push individuals in need into danger, which is at the heart of the UN Refugee convention (and its key article 33 on no-push backs).

The EU-Turkey agreement on refugees in the Aegean adopted on March 18, 2016, contains the elements of such a policy – but to serve as a good model it has to be fully implemented. The agreement is based on existing EU laws on asylum and on the principles of the UN Refugee Convention. It commits the EU to helping improve conditions for refugees in Turkey (the country in the world hosting the largest number of refugees today) with the most generous contribution the EU has ever made for refugees in any country in the world. It also makes improving the work and quality of the Turkish asylum service a matter of direct interest to the EU: only if Turkey has a functioning asylum system can it be considered a safe third country. Finally and crucially, it foresees substantial resettlement of refugees in an orderly manner from Turkey once flows of irregular arrivals in the Aegean are reduced. The fact that this last provision has not yet been implemented seriously does not make it any less important to the overall logic of the agreement.

Even without full implementation, the agreement has produced a dramatic and immediate impact on refugee movements in the Eastern Mediterranean. Crossings in the Aegean Sea fell from 115,000 in the first two months of the year to 3,300 in June and July. The number of people who drowned in the Aegean fell from 366 people in the first three months of the year to seven between May and July. This was achieved without pushing refugees to take other, more dangerous routes (the people arriving in Southern Italy this year were from African countries). And there have not been any mass expulsions from Greece either, something NGOs had feared would happen. In fact, more people had been sent back from Greece to Turkey in the three months preceding the agreement (967) than in the ten months since it was concluded (777).

It is obvious, however, that the EU has no current plan or credible strategy for the Central Mediterranean, and this presents a huge risk. The status quo is clearly unacceptable from a humanitarian point of view: in 2016 an unprecedented number of people (more than 4,400) drowned in the Central Mediterranean. It is also politically explosive, lending ammunition to those on the far-right across Europe (from Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to Marine Le Pen in France and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany). They argue that the only way to control migration to Europe is by abolishing the Schengen open borders regime and restoring border controls within the European Union. The lack of a coherent EU strategy has led some to suggest looking to Australia for inspiration, praising a model whereby anyone reaching the EU by sea should be denied the right to even apply for asylum in the EU and be returned to North Africa. This would amount to the EU turning its back on the Refugee Convention, which would be a moment of existential crisis also for the UNHCR anf global policy on asylum.

A humane and effective border and asylum policy is indeed possible, and it does not involve emulating the Australian model. The first step requires implementing the EU-Turkey agreement in full. The second step would involve applying the right lessons to the Central Mediterranean as well. Both would require the EU to set up new structures, including credible EU asylum missions and instruments to resettle refugees, among others. Both depend on Greece and Italy persuading other EU countries that the challenge they face is a European one that requires innovative European solutions.

Following Through

Nearly a year after it was signed into action, the EU-Turkey agreement remains at risk – and that despite its successes so far. This is because of inadequate implementation.

On average, less than 100 people have been returned to Turkey each month; many people who arrived on the Aegean islands have remained struck there in limbo for extended periods of time, while the number of new arrivals has been some 100 a day on average in recent months.

All this creates a realistic scenario for failure. Greek authorities, under pressure and without an answer for islanders who see Lesbos and Chios turning into a European Nauru (the Pacific island where Australia sends people who arrive by boat), might move larger numbers of people from the Aegean islands to the mainland. That would again lead to rising numbers of people crossing the Aegean. Once larger groups are moved to the Greek mainland, the humanitarian situation for refugees there, which is already bad, will deteriorate further. We would see the populist-led calls to build a stronger wall north of Greece multiply.

Already now, the number one topic of conversation among migrants stranded on the Greek mainland is the cost of getting smuggled across the Balkan route, either via Macedonia or Bulgaria. It is hard to imagine Greece making a major effort to stop people from leaving the country if Greeks feel the EU has left them alone. The weak Macedonian reception and asylum system might then collapse within weeks, once more people cross the border. The Western Balkans would turn into a battleground for migrants, smugglers, border guards, soldiers and vigilante groups, destabilizing an already fragile region.

If this scenario played out, it would be a serious blow to European leaders like Angela Merkel, who argue that it is possible to have a humane and effective EU policy on border management while respecting the refugee convention. It would also be a blow to already tense EU-Turkish relations. What is needed now is the right implementation strategy.

The EU should appoint a special representative for the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement – a former prime minister or former foreign minister with the experience and authority to address urgent implementation issues on the ground. To preserve the agreement, the European Commission and Turkey should address all concerns raised about Turkey as a safe third country for those who should be returned from Greece. Such concerns can be addressed. As UNHCR noted already on March 18, 2016, everything depends on serious implementation:

“People being returned to Turkey and needing international protection must have a fair and proper determination of their claims, and within a reasonable time. Assurances against refoulement, or forced return, must be in place. Reception and other arrangements need to be readied in Turkey before anyone is returned from Greece. People determined to be needing international protection need to be able to enjoy asylum, without discrimination, in accordance with accepted international standards, including effective access to work, health care, education for children, and, as necessary, social assistance.”

Turkey would need to present a concrete proposal on how to ensure – and how to make transparent – that it is fulfilling the conditions set by EU law to be a credible safe third country for refugees of any origin, whether they are Pakistani, Afghan or Syrian, that Greece might return. It would need to guarantee – with more assistance from the EU and UNCHR, if need be – that there are sufficient asylum case workers, translators and legal aid in place to provide an efficient asylum process. There would need to be full transparency surrounding what is happening to each and every person returned, as well. Given the small number of people concerned this is all doable.

At the same time, the EU should send a European asylum mission to the Greek islands, including at least 200 case workers that should be able to take binding decisions on asylum claims (which would require an invitation by the Greek government and changes in Greek law, and assurances that any decision taken by such a mission could be suspended by a chief Greek legal officer). Those who are given protection should then be relocated across the EU immediately; all others sent back to Turkey. The principle behind an EU mission would be obvious: in times of crisis, there is a need for a substantial number of case workers, interpreters and reception officers to ensure quality standards for assessing protection requests, and with speed where most asylum requests are submitted. It would be unfair to blame Greece or any other country for being unable to deal rapidly with asylum requests of the tens of thousands of people; it would be unreasonable for Greece not to ask for such a European mission. Ultimately it is a matter of political will on the part of the EU and Turkey to deal with the few thousand asylum seekers now on the Aegean islands, in line with international norms and EU directives for their mutual benefit.

Adapting the Agreement

So far it has proven difficult to send a sufficient number of EU asylum caseworkers to Greece. At the same time, there are still no decent reception conditions for the relatively small number of people who have arrived on the islands since April 2016. These challenges cast serious doubt on proposals to slow illegal migration to Italy by setting up reception centers somewhere in North Africa; as some EU politicans have suggested, everyone who reaches Italy would be taken there to have their asylum claims processed. This is sometimes presented as a model inspired by Australia, which puts everyone who arrives via the sea in camps on the Pacific island of Nauru or on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. In fact, asylum seekers held in Nauru in recent years have been forced to wait many years for their applications to be decided. Conditions of detention were and remain intentionally harsh to deter further arrivals. And once asylum is granted, it remains unclear where refugees might go (recently the US offered to help out and promised to accept a large number of people moved to these islands by Australia; it remains unclear whether this will actually happen). It is important to note that Nauru never hosted more than a thousand people at any given time. The notion that the EU might outsource the detention of tens of thousands of asylum seekers to camps across North Africa for long periods and under similar conditions is surely a recipe for failure.

So how might the EU reduce the number of arrivals – and deaths – in the Central Mediterranean? The key lies in fast processing of asylum applications of anyone who arrives, and in fast returns of those whose claims are rejected to their countries of origin. Both of these tasks should become European responsibilities. Anyone who would not get asylum should be returned to his or her countries of origin. Prioritizing the returns of anyone who reaches Italy after a given date and does not get asylum should become the central issue to be negotiated with African countries of origin. On the other hand, those who are given asylum should be relocated across the EU to support Italy and Greece and replace the inadequate Dublin system (the notion that Dutch or German case officers would decide which refugees remain in Greece or Italy would obviously not be acceptable to these countries).

What would be the likely impact of such a policy on arrivals? It is very likely that these would fall sharply.

Nigerians were the largest group of arrivals in 2016, and the majority would be unlikely to risk their lives crossing the deadly Sahara, unstable Libya and the Central Mediterranean and spending thousands of Euros on smugglers when the likelihood of being returned to Nigeria would be upwards of 70 percent, which is the current rate of rejection of Nigerian asylum applications in the EU. As noted, ensuring that Nigeria, Senegal and other countries take back their nationals who arrive in Italy after an agreed date should be the chief priority in talks between the EU and Nigeria – similar to the commitment Turkey made to take back without delay people who arrive in Greece after March 20, 2016. This would require that an EU asylum mission in Italy is able to process all claims within weeks. Rapid readmission would bring down the number of people who stay in the EU after their applications are rejected. In this way, the number of irregular arrivals becomes manageable – with less business for smugglers and far fewer deaths at sea. The aim might be to reduce the number of all irregular arrivals by sea to below 100,000 (for an EU of over 500 million people) already in 2017. Such a goal is realistic: it is, after all, the average number of irregular arrivals into the whole EU in the years 2009-2013.

European leaders could thus demonstrate to their electorates that it is possible to control external sea borders without undermining the refugee convention or treating those who arrive badly to deter new arrivals. European leaders should simultaneously push forward the global debate on orderly transfers of refugees through resettlement. The only way to do so is to lead by example, building up EU capacity for resettlement as well boosting the UNHCR’s capacity to do more. Coalitions of willing EU states should commit to resettle a significant number of vulnerable refugees each year.

In recent decades, resettlement has never reached more than 100,000 a year in the whole world, and of these the US took the lion’s share. Until now European states have not built up the bureaucratic machinery for large-scale resettlement. For this reason, pushing the EU to fully implement the resettlement provisions in the Aegean agreement (point 4) is vital and deserves to be an advocacy priority for human rights NGOs and refugee rights defenders.

In the face of rising anti-refugee sentiment across the world, it will take a strong coalition of countries to protect the refugee convention. Such a coalition requires governments who are able to win elections on the platform that a humane asylum policy and effective border control can be combined and can even reinforce each other. Such a policy needs to be based on core principles: no-push backs; no-Nauru; discouraging irregular passage through fast readmission and fast asylum processes; expansion of resettlement of refugees; and serious financial help to host countries elsewhere. If this happens lessons from the Aegean agreement with Turkey – the only plan in recent years that dramatically reduced the numbers of people arriving without changing EU refugee law – might help develop a blueprint for protecting refugee rights in an age of anxiety. The stakes – for Europe and for the UN Refugee Convention – could not be higher.  

 

 

Blind in den Sturm – wie die Europäische Kommission in Griechenland versagt (in German)

Forschung in Lesbos - hier im Rathaus
Forschung in Lesbos – hier im Rathaus

Ein Artikel in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung vom 27 September 2016 (Brüssel: Vertrag mit Türkei bewährt sich, FAZ, Seite 2, Dienstag) zeigt zweierlei: die Europäische Kommission erkennt nicht, was notwendig ist, um das EU-Türkei Abkommen umzusetzen. Sie versäumt es, Politiker und die Öffentlichkeit aufzurütteln. Stattdessen verschleiert sie Probleme. Das ist unverantwortlich und gefährlich. Wenn nichts passiert, könnte das Abkommen in den nächsten Wochen in sich zusammenbrechen. In diesem kurzen Überblick stehen die Aussagen der Kommission, die in dem Artikel zitiert werden, den tatsächlichen Entwicklungen gegenüber. Ein aufmerksamer Leser kann von selbst erkennen, dass hier vieles nicht zusammenpasst:

Die Zahl der Flüchtlinge, die in der Ägäis ankommen

Der Artikel beginnt optimistisch:

„Das vor sechs Monaten zwischen der EU und der Türkei vereinbarte Flüchtlingsabkommen scheint sich insgesamt zu bewähren. Zu dieser positiven Einschätzung ist die Europäische Kommission in einer Bilanz gelangt. ‚Ich habe keine großen Befürchtungen, dass das Abkommen zwischen der EU und der Türkei scheitert. Es steht für beide Seiten zu viel auf dem Spiel’, sagte ein mit dem Dossier betrauter Beamter am Montag.“

Dafür bietet der ungenannte Beamte folgende Argumente:

„Die Zahl der über die Ägäis aus der Türkei auf die griechischen Inseln gelangenden Flüchtlinge sei mit zuletzt durchschnittlich hundert am Tag auf einem ‚historisch niedrigen Stand’.“

Ankunft von Flüchtlingen aus der Türkei auf griechischen Inseln (2016)[1]

Datum Ankommende Flüchtlinge
Täglicher Durchschnitt Januar 1,932
Täglicher Durchschnitt Februar 1,904
Täglicher Durchschnitt 1-20 März 1,148
Täglicher Durchschnitt 21-31 März 333
Täglicher Durchschnitt April 121
Täglicher Durchschnitt Mai 55
Täglicher Durchschnitt Juni 51
Täglicher Durchschnitt Juli 59
Täglicher Durchschnitt August 111

 

Die Zahl der ankommenden Flüchtlinge lag im August bei durchschnittlich 111 am Tag. Das sind doppelt so viel wie im Mai oder Juni. Dieser Trend ist besorgniserregend. Es ist auch kein „historisch niedriger Stand“: auf ein Jahr umgelegt bedeuten 111 Ankommende am Tag insgesamt etwa 40,000 Ankommende im Jahr.

Um das einzuordnen hilft es, sich die Gesamtzahl ALLER, die die EU Außengrenzen in den letzten Jahren überquert haben, vor Augen zu halten: das waren von 2009 bis 2013 jährlich durchschnittlich 110,000 an ALLEN EU Außengrenzen. 40,000 im Jahr nur in der Ägäis wären eine historisch hohe Zahl, die nur verglichen mit dem Ausnahmejahr 2015 (als über 800,000 ankamen) „niedrig“ erscheinen mag. Dass der negative Trend der letzten Wochen nicht einmal erwähnt wird ist auch merkwürdig.

 

Die Zahl jener, die von den Inseln in die Türkei zurückgeschickt werden

„Positiv wird in der Kommission herausgestellt, dass seit Inkrafttreten des Abkommens von den griechischen Inseln bis zum Montag insgesamt 578 Flüchtlinge in die Türkei zurückgeschickt worden seien. Allein am Montag brachte ein Schiff 70 Migranten von der Insel Lesbos in die Türkei Dikili zurück.“

Das bedeutet, dass seit Inkrafttreten des Abkommens im Durchschnitt pro Monat weniger als 100 Flüchtlinge in die Türkei zurückgeschickt wurden – weniger als derzeit täglich auf den Inseln ankommen.

Was die Kommission nicht erklärt, ist erneut der tatsächliche Trend. Der sieht nämlich so aus: auch im September wurden insgesamt nur 90 Leute zurückgebracht. Im August waren es 16, im Juli niemand, im Juni 21 und im Mai 55. Die allermeisten wurden zu Beginn des Abkommens, im April (386), zurückgebracht. In der ersten Oktoberwoche ist noch einmal ein Transfer von 75 Menschen geplant. Doch danach ist es wieder unklar aus wie es weitergeht. Von einer Trendwende kann derzeit keine Rede sein.

Transfer von Migranten aus Griechenland in die Türkei bis 27 September 2016[2]

Date Transfers
4 April 202
8 April 123
26 April 49
27 April 12
18 May 4
20 May 51
8 June 8
9 June 13
16 June 6
17 August 8
18 August 6
25 August 2
7 September 5
8 September 13
23 September 7
26 September 70
Total 579
   

 

Die Kommission erklärt übrigens selbst, warum es auch in den nächsten Monaten nur sehr wenige Rückführungen geben wird:

„Derzeit gibt es mit jeweils drei Mitgliedern besetzte Berufungsgremien, die derzeit monatlich nur 200 Fälle zum Abschluss bringen können Zur Bewältigung dieses ‚Flaschenhalses’ müssten die Verfahren gestrafft, mehr Personal müsse eingestellt werden. Ziel sei es, die Dauer des Prüfverfahrens auf zwei bis drei Wochen zu begrenzen.”

Das bedeutet: egal wie viele Fälle die Asylbehörde in erster Instanz derzeit bearbeitet (und es sind nicht viele – siehe weiter unten), die erwartete Zahl derjenigen, die von der zweiten Instanz monatlich „zum Abschluss“ gebracht wird, liegt bei „nur 200“ … und das bedeutet noch nicht, dass alle 200 auch in die Türkei zurückgebracht werden.

Derzeit gibt es noch keine Erfahrung mit den Berufungsgremien, aber selbst wenn ALLE 200 Fälle pro Monat in einem Rückführungsentscheid in die Türkei enden, wären das weniger als derzeit in ZWEI TAGEN auf die Inseln kommen.

Die kleine griechische Asylbehörde ist der Aufgabe auf den Inseln nicht gewachsen.

„In der EU-Behörde wird zudem erwartet, dass auch die Zahl der ‚Rückführungen’ von Flüchtlingen aus Griechenland in die Türkei in Kürze deutlich zunehmen wird. Inzwischen sei in Griechenland über die Zulässigkeit von rund 3500 Asylanträgen – davon gut 3000 von syrischen Flüchtlingen – entschieden worden. Dies entspricht der im März gegebenen Zusage, Asylanträge im Schnellverfahren zu prüfen.“

Doch selbst wenn 3,500 Anträge in sechs Monaten entschieden wurden, dann sind das weniger als 600 im Monat. Derzeit kommen PRO WOCHE mehr Flüchtlinge und Migranten auf den Inseln an.

Man kann es drehen wie man will: sechs Monate nach Inkrafttreten des Abkommens haben weder die erste Instanz der Asylbehörde, noch die Berufungskommissionen, noch die – immer noch dramatisch unterbesetzte – EASO Mission auch nur ansatzweise die Ressourcen, die notwendig wären zu verhindern, dass die Schere zwischen der Zahl der Ankommenden und der Zahl der in die Türkei zurückgeführten nicht weiter aufgeht.

Die letzte der zitierten Aussagen der Kommission wirkt vor diesem Hintergrund bemerkenswert:

„Günstig habe sich zuletzt die Versorgungslage für die Flüchtlinge entwickelt.“

Dass sich die „Versorgungslage“ auf den Inseln günstig entwickelt haben soll, nachdem das wichtigste Lager Moria auf Lesbos erst vor kurzem brannte, während die Differenz zwischen Bedarf und Resourcen immer grösser wird, und obwohl Proteste der Bevölkerung auf den Inseln immer mehr zunehmen, ist schwer zu glauben. Es widerspricht auch dem, was Journalisten und Menschenrechtsorganisationen von den Inseln berichten. Abgesehen davon ist jedem Laien klar was es bedeutet, wenn

  • sich heute doppelt so viele Menschen auf den Inseln befinden als Kapazitäten vorhanden sind, sie gut zu versorgen (UNHCR);
  • jeden Tag so viele Menschen auf den Inseln ankommen wie durchschnittlich im Monat in die Türkei gebracht werden;
  • der Trend zeigt, dass die Zahl der Ankommenden steigt, die Effizienz der Behörden aber seit Monaten stagniert.

All das wirft die Frage auf: Wie kann eine Organisation, die bestehende Probleme und alarmierende Trends nicht wahrnimmt, diese Probleme lösen? Und was macht die Europäische Kommission, wenn in wenigen Wochen die griechischen Behörden das Handtuch werfen müssen und tausende von den Inseln wegbringen, und damit den Schlepper in der Türkei signalisieren, dass das ganze Abkommen einzustürzen beginnt?

 

Kapazität und Auslastung in den Lagern auf den griechischen Inseln, 13. September 2016[3]

 

Island Kapazität Auslastung
Lesvos 3,500 5,660
Chios 1,100 3,598
Kos 1,000 1,540
Samos 850 1,425
Leros 1,000 702
Rhodes 136
Karpathos 71
Kalymnos 24
Megisti 14
Total 7,450 13,171

 

 PS: Was tatsächlich – schnell – passieren müsste hat ESI erst vor kurzem in diesem Papier beschrieben: Background paper: On solid ground? Eleven facts about the EU-Turkey Agreement (12 September 2016)

Wir haben unsere Vorschläge auch in vielen Gesprächen, in internationalen Medien oder bei Veranstaltungen in Den Haag, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Wien und Berlin erkläutert:

Flüchtlinge auf Lesbos
Flüchtlinge auf Lesbos

 

[1]             Source: UNHCR (Weekly report, 4 August 2016)

[2]             Source: European Commission

[3]             Source: UNHCR