Is the EU visa proposal anti-Muslim?

Let me first say that ESI welcomes the recent Commission proposal on visa free travel to the Balkans. Considering what expectations of progress were only 12 months ago – looking forward to a year with EU Parliamentary and German parliamentary elections, against a background of enlargement fatigue and a deepening economic crisis – this proposal is a very positive signal for the whole Balkan region.

We wrote an article on this, which you find here. The article also appeared as a commentary on BIRN.

We have a serious concern about the implications of this proposal for Kosovo. But this is not due to shortcomings in the Commission-led effort: it is rather that Kosovo is excluded from the meritocratic roadmap process. We also have one suggestion to improve the proposal for Bosnia and Albania. But much of the criticism made of the Commission proposal in the past week does not appear fair to us.

Ok, you might say, but what about the most important criticism one could hear in institutions such as the European Parliament: that the European Commission proposal on visa free travel, which was announced this week, is anti-Muslim?

A good friend and expert on the Balkans sent me the following email and question:

“I have been approached by Muslim friends from Britain, Germany and Turkey asking me whether the Commission has understood that the exclusion of BiH and Albania is sending out a negative signal to Muslim communities around Europe and beyond. Furthermore in the case of BiH where Orthodox and Catholic inhabitants have an option of joint citizenship with Serbia and Croatia, Serbs and Croats from BiH will be able to travel freely using their Serb and Croat passports while Bosniak Muslims will not. Has this rather urgent political issue been considered either by you or by the Commission?”

It is a serious question, and we have discussed it a lot inside ESI. So let me share with you the email I sent him in response:

” Yes, this issue has been considered. Anticipating these debates, we looked in great detail at every one of the five countries, producing a one page score card and a very much longer analysis of each of the conditions that still have to be met based on studying all Commission documents and expert reports.

All of these can be found here: http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=353

Concerning Bosnia, look in particular at:

the one page grade report

the detailed Bosnia analysis

Now compare these to the one page report and detailed analysis of Macedonia, and it is obvious that there is a difference.

In addition, the Commission has recently outlined itself the precise conditions that Bosnia and Albania still have to meet, sending a detailed letter to the Bosnian Ministry of Security.

In short, considering that meeting the benchmark conditions is the only criteria for visa free travel, the Commission has made the right decisions so far. Bosnia was the last (!) country to introduce biometric passports, for instance, something that was due to sheer incompetence and lack of focus. You could argue that this should not be a criteria (and Bulgaria was given visa free travel in 2001 without having biometric passports), but this is changing the rules of the game while the game is being played. This never works in the EU.

Thus, what critics of the Commission proposal for Bosnia are doing is not in fact arguing with these facts. They want to change the terms of the debate.

Critics argue that that there is a strong moral case for Bosnia to be granted visa free travel. The gist of this argument is a rhetorical question: “How can Mladic travel to the EU with his Serbian passport, but the relatives of his Srebrenica victims cannot?”

Critics also argue that this decision is inherently anti-Bosniak, as Croats and Serbs in Bosnia can circumvent the problems with the Bosnian passport by applying for Croat and Serb passports. This is of course not a new problem at all (in the case of Croatia it was always true).

I personally have a lot of sympathy for this argument (although I hope that Mladic tries out his new Serbian passport soon and ends up in The Hague as a result).

But this is an argument to give Bosnians visa free travel already in 1995! The fact that we are now talking about 2010 shows that it has not worked too well until now.

In fact, purely moral arguments for visa free travel have never impressed sceptical Europeans, only already convinced friends of the Balkans. This is, after all, not a new debate. Moral arguments have been made many times in recent years. They have been made for Serbia (after courageous young people toppled Milosevic, did they not deserve visa free travel?), for Kosovo (there was a decade of apartheid, followed by mass murder and massive expulsions in 1999: how does Kosovo deserve to be the most isolated country in the world today?), for Macedonia (having implemented the Ohrid Peace Agreement and been granted EU candidate status in 2005, did the Macedonians not deserve visa free travel at least as much as Romanians did in 2001), etc …

Moral arguments are important, but they are not sufficient. This we have learned in the past 15 years.

What brought about this week’s breakthrough, however, was the fact that the terms of debate changed recently: that the logic of the process became the slogan of our campaign “strict but fair”. Conditionality turned out to be the best friend of the region!

The argument for the roadmap process is not one of political morality. It was from the outset based on a very rational argument: that it actually IS in the EU’s security interest not to have to rely on visa, but to be able to cooperate with Balkan countries that have implemented the very demanding set of reforms described in the roadmaps. This makes everyone safer. Granting visa free travel is not a gift to a long-suffering region, but a win-win situation for all Europeans.

visa-board-meeting-13-july-2009-060

“How visa-free travel makes Europe safer” … meeting with former interior ministers Giuliano Amato (Italy) and Otto Schily (Germany) this week in Istanbul to discuss the ESI White List Project

We strongly supported this logic, because we felt that it would work. We were also convinced that leaders in these countries were capable of surprising the EU and actually implementing these demands faster than anticipated. And this is indeed what has happened.

Even Bosnia is today much closer to visa free travel than it has ever been in the years since 1995.

Of course, there is always a danger that despite a process of objective assessment (with numerous expert missions visiting the region in recent months) political considerations would enter at the end; that prejudices could cloud the process.

Contrary to what most friends of Bosnia in Europe believe, however, allowing a bigger role for purely political considerations would likely be harmful not beneficial for Bosnia, given its terrible image in some EU countries and the regular recurrence of articles on dangerous islamists in Sarajevo (again earlier this year in Der Spiegel, an article on “the fifth column of the prophet”). We have long warned that this image, which is not deserved, as well as regular alarmist articles that Bosnia might be about to go to war again are doing terrible damage to the European future of the country. But one effect of this bad press is that the less European decisions are based on perceptions, and the more on facts, the better for Bosnia.

Thus, I believe that the principle of “strict but fair” is also in Bosnia’s (and Albania’s) interest. Both countries have an image problem in Europe that can best be overcome by focusing on concrete deliverables.

At the same time, Bosnian leaders need to be told by their friends that if Macedonian Albanians and Macedonians could implement these changes following their fighting in 2001, so must they. Until now at least there is no evidence that this is not actually in their hands.

There are two potential challenges to “strict but fair”:

Some claim that EU leaders do indeed have prejudices about Balkan Muslims, and that even once Bosnia fulfills all conditions it will be judged more harshly than Serbia or Montenegro are now.Until now, at least, we have found no evidence that this is the case.It is a strong argument, however, for making the assessment process as transparent as possible, which is the main motivation behind our dedicated website. We believe that full transparency is in the interest of everyone, which is why you can find all relevant documents there.
Some people in Sarajevo claim that Bosnian Serb politicians might sabotage the reforms needed for Bosnian passport holder, to undermine the Bosnian state, since Bosnian Serbs might in any case gain access to the EU through their Serbian citizenship.This is definitely something that needs to be monitored. Until now we have found little evidence for this. In fact, once we published the visa score card showing Bosnia in last position a few weeks ago a series of laws were passed that suggested that Bosnian politicians were sensitive to the charge of letting their people down.It is also the case that the EU would not look kindly at a sudden increase in Serbian biometric passports being handed out to Bosnian Serbs.

In short, for now the best message to give to Bosnian leaders is not to lean back and hope that Europe’s bad conscience about Srebrenica will do their work, but to sit down and focus on the roadmap. The EU should help, monitor the process closely, and respond fairly.

This has also been our answer to questions by Bosnian media in recent days:

“Yes, you have a moral case, but this is unlikely to convince sceptical interior ministers in sceptical EU member states. Dont’ rely on it. In fact, the example of Macedonia and Montenegro shows you that implementing these reforms will lead to the desired goal much faster than any campaign based on the history of a war that ended in 1995. As for anti-Bosniak prejudice, so far we have not found evidence of it in the Commission evaluations. Lets be vigilant, but lets admit also that so far the Commission has been fair according to the standards of the roadmap process.”

In fact, we feel, looking in detail at all the still outstanding conditions, that if a real effort is made, Bosnia and Albania might be able to meet these conditions within the next 12 months. That would obviously be best for everyone. All our efforts should now go towards making this possible.

This is why our protest focuses on the specific commission recommendations concerning Kosovo: Kosovo is not even being offered the chance that Bosnia and Albania have to prove that it can or cannot implement the roadmap requirements. This is the opposite of “strict but fair” … a lose-lose situation for the whole region and the EU.”

Further reading:

15 May 20096 June 2009

The Stockholm consensus on EU enlargement

A disclosure at the very outset: since 2000 Swedish governments have been among ESI’s most faithful supporters.

This is hardly a coincidence. On every foreign policy issue important to us Sweden is a strong advocate within the EU, from support for EU enlargement to the Balkans and Turkey to a European perspective for countries in the Eastern neighbourhood. Being one of the wealthiest member states, having a good record of implementing European legislation, and not being suspected of having a secret agenda of undermining the European project, adds to its credibility.

What would it take for EU-ropeans, old and new, social-democrat, liberal and conservative, to embrace the Swedish outlook on Europe’s future? To share the vision one finds in the speeches of Sweden’s current foreign minister, Carl Bildt, for instance in his presentation delivered in 2007 in Bruges at the College of Europe:

“In Maastricht in 1991, the then European Community decided to transform itself into a more ambitious European Union, and soon this Union was prepared to open up not only to old former ‘neutrals’ like Austria, Finland and Sweden but also – and far more important – to all the countries of Central Europe, the Baltic region and down towards the Black Sea.

There is no doubt that it was the magnetism of the Union and the model it provided that made the transformation we have since seen in all of these countries possible. When – at some time in the future – the history of the Union is written, this might well be seen as truly its finest hour.

Today, we see 10 nations with some 100 million people from the Gulf of Finland in the north down towards the Bosporus in the south creating a new belt of lasting peace, stable democracies and bubbling prosperity in an area that history had otherwise reserved for instability, conflicts and great power rivalry.

Our Union today is a union of approximately 500 million people. It is the largest integrated economy in the world. It is by far the largest trading power of the planet – larger than the second and third put together. It is the biggest market for more than 130 nations around the world. It provides more than 60 per cent of all ODA to the developing countries. And – remarkable as it sounds – the value of the euros in circulation on global markets exceeds the value of dollars.

We certainly have our problems – but we should not overlook the weight and importance that we have in the global economy. Others do not.”

And then Bildt continues:

“What is needed is a profound strengthening of the soft power of Europe. We certainly need to strengthen the hard power as well – but at the end of the day peace is built by thoughts and by ballots more than by tanks and by bullets.

A critical part of the soft power of Europe lies in the continued process of enlargement – a Europe that remains open to those in our part of the world who wish to share their sovereignty with us, accept the rule of law and commit themselves to the building of open, secular and free societies.

There are those who want to slow down or perhaps even stop the process altogether. We have heard talk of the need to define the borders of Europe. And to draw these borders as close to the present borders of the European Union as possible. But drawing big lines on big maps of eastern Europe risks being a dangerous exercise for us all.

Because it means defining firmly not only for whom the doors will remain open, but also slamming the doors in the face of some for whom the magnetism of Europe remains a major driving force for profound political and economic reforms. It means telling them to go elsewhere. And that means doing things differently also in terms of the evolution of their societies. If we put out the light of European integration in the east or southeast of Europe – however faint or distant that light might be – we risk seeing the forces of atavistic nationalism or submission to other masters taking over. And if that happens, no lines on maps will be able to protect us from the consequences.”

At a recent ECFR meeting in Stockholm Carl Bildt reiterated these positions, striking a positive tone that stood in marked contrast to the pessimism about Europe’s future I noticed among many of the other ECFR members.

Strikingly, in Sweden support for enlargement is not controversial. Swedes of all political families believe that European values can be shared by Turks and Moldavians, Ukrainians and Georgians, to the benefit of all of Europe. As Goran Lennmarker, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Riskdag (parliament), told me just this week, the Swedish consensus today is that when any European country meets the conditions for accession, it has a right to be accepted as a member.

Public opinion is also supportive and so far the Swedish political elite have decided not to strike a populist tune on enlargement. 63 percent of Swedes argue that enlargement has strengthened the EU: this is the highest support among the 15 ‘old’ member states, where an outright majority for this view exists only in Spain (59 percent), Denmark (53 percent) and Greece (53 percent). A clear majority of Swedes is in favour of the integration of each of the Western Balkan states (see below the Spring 2008 Eurobarometer results).

*SWEDISH ATTITUDES TO FURTHER ENLARGEMENT (Eurobarometer):*
*Spring 2008*	*Alb*	*BiH*	*Cro*	*Kos*	*Mac*	*Mon*	*Ser*	*Tur*
*For*	58	66	71	61	66	66	61	46
*Against*	32	25	20	29	24	24	30	45
*Undecided*	10	9	9	10	10	10	9	9

Some years ago, the Swedish parliament passed a resolution offering Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus a European perspective (provided, of course, that they meet the Copenhagen criteria).

All of this raises interesting questions: why is a position that seems mere common sense in Stockholm so controversial in Paris and Berlin? Namely, that previous enlargements have made the EU stronger, and that future enlargements – as long as they are carried out cautiously – will do so as well?

Of course, some might say, Sweden is doing particularly well. This is true. Until the current economic crisis unemployment was low (it is now rising fast, however, to almost 8 percent in the first quarter of 2009). The country ranks among the 10 richest countries in the world in terms of per capita GDP. Combining GDP per capita with indicators for eduction, literacy and life expectancy, Sweden came 7th worldwide in the latest Human Development Index published in December 2008. Sweden’s economy is highly competitive: in international surveys of competitiveness, Sweden excels, coming 4th in the World Economic Forum competitiveness ranking 2008/2009, just behind the US, Switzerland and Denmark.

Perhaps one reason for the strong consensus in favour of EU enlargement is a general confidence in the Swedish model of balancing freedom and security? Perhaps Swedes are more prepared to take risks, since failure is not so disastrous, for individuals and for groups in society? According to this logic it becomes easier to embrace EU enlargement against the background of a public commitment to social welfare. This promises that within society burdens are shared, so the benefits of enlargement do not accrue only to a few social groups. A domestic welfare bargain appears to underpin support for an outward looking EU: relatively low levels of income inequality, and comparatively high per capita income taxes (in 2006 Swedish wage taxes were the second highest in the world, behind Denmark: see here).

Confidence in the future is also expressed in one of the most striking recent policy innovations: a reform of the rules for labour migration, adopted by parliament in December 2008. As a result of this reform, a Swedish employer is now the one to decide whether a given non-EU foreign worker is needed for hire (before these reforms the Swedish Public Employment Service decided this; for more details go to the website of the Swedish Migration Board). This is implemented in a country in which 12 percent of residents are born abroad.

How about gender policies? It is certainly interesting that the country with the strongest commitment to European soft power is also the one with the largest number of women in positions of political authority: in the most recent survey by the IPU on women in national parliaments, Sweden comes out second in the world, just edged out by Rwanda. Or is having low rates of corruption a key to a shared belief in soft power in foreign policy? In the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Sweden comes 2nd in the world, only beaten by Denmark.

Transparency in policy making might also help support a pragmatic EU policy. Sweden is famously transparent in its public administration, making it perhaps harder for theories of elite conspiracies (“enlargement is a capitalist plot”) to gain ground. Sweden’s freedom of information policies ensure that all external communications with ministers and state secretaries are made public. In principle all items of mail to the government and government offices are public documents, something that has led to clashes between Sweden and the rest of the EU (see here for one example).

Are people who are satisfied with their lives more likely to be open to others? Swedes score well in international happiness indicators: in one table based on the 2005 World Values Survey Sweden also comes in 2nd place. (Behind Iceland, which was probably before its economy crashed! Let me admit, though, that I am not all confident about international “happiness rankings”, with Bangladesh coming out on top in one global happiness survey, and Nigeria in first place in another).

And then there is the structure of the Swedish economy: its openness to the world economy, the large number of Swedish multinationals, traditional support for free trade policies. Sweden’s relatively small population (9 million) lives in Europe’s fourth largest country in terms of land mass; its economy has historically been dependent on export: first of its raw materials, then its industrial goods and finally its ideas, to world markets.

But neither wealth nor exposure to international trade alone explain the strong commitment to globalisation and EU enlargement: otherwise Switzerland, Austria or the Netherlands would have adopted foreign policies similar to Sweden (the contrast with Austria attitudes, when it comes to Turkish accession, is particularly dramatic).

What then are the intellectual and emotional roots of the Swedish approach to foreign policy? And what would a more Swedish EU foreign policy look like?

To answer these questions, I suggest to turning away for a moment from international league tables; and to pick up a very different set of books and travel to a special region south of Stockholm to understand the paradox of the Stockholm consensus on enlargement and the Swedish approach to politics. But more on this later.

Recommended, if you want to know more about Sweden: Previous blog entry: Silences and the new Sweden. For Jon Stewart’s take on the Swedish model, please go here. It is hilarious and, as always with Stewart, enlightening. Of course, the country The Daily Show presents is too good to be true … a place without conflict, full of attractive and reasonable people …

To counterbalance (somewhat) this approach let me note that there is of course no shortage of critical Swedes who argue that, for all of its comparative successes, Sweden constantly needs further reforms to remain competitive. Some of these critics can be found in Timbro, a free-market think-tank, which has challenged what it perceived as “Suedo-sclerosis” since its foundation in 1978. There you also find an interesting report by economist Mauricio Rojas, Sweden after the Swedish Model – from Tutorial State to Enabling State, which tells “the story of the rise and fall of the old Swedish model” and the transition to what Rojas calls the current Swedish “enabling state”.

In Stockholm this week I also had a long conversation with one of the most articulate and influential representatives of this view, Peter Egardt – Carl Bildt’s former state secretary (in the early 1990s) and now president and CEO of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, member of the national bank, and long-time board member of Timbro (1995-2005). As Egardt put it in an article on how to attract the “creative class” to Swedish cities:

“Abroad, many believe Sweden to be the very showcase for social democratic welfare states. However, ambitious reforms implemented during the past few decades have transformed Sweden into a competitive economy with an increasing degree of economic freedom and strong growth. In the wake of this development, culture, fine food and the arts have all blossomed in Swedish cities. Tourists, as well as businesses, are attracted not least to the capital city of Stockholm. The strategy underlying this development has been based on a sound business-and-growth-friendly policy orientation, not a Berlin style emphasis on public subsidies of culture over families and businesses. Cultural development has occurred as the result of a growing economy, not the opposite.”

For another outsider’s view how in Sweden “high per capita income and open markets go hand in hand with social cohesion” read the latest OECD Report (2008). There is also a lot of information and background reading on Sweden on the website of the Swedish institute: www.si.se.

Finally, let me note that Mark Leonard, the current director of ECFR, first used the concept of a “Stockholm consensus” in his book “Why Europe will run the 21st Century”:

“The Stockholm consensus amounts to nothing less than a new social contract in which a strong and flexible state underpins an innovative, open, knowledge economy. This contract means that the state provides the resources for educating its citizens, treating their illnesses, providing childcare so they can work, and integration lessons for newcomers. In exchange, citizens take training, are more flexible, and newcomers integrate themselves.”

8 December 200817 December 2008

The message from Prague is loud and clear

Our meetings, organised by ESI and the Prague Security Studies Institute, took place in the first week of December at the marvelous Czernin Palace of the Czech Foreign Ministry. Czech policy makers, journalists and experts spoke to a distinguished group of policy and opinion makers from the Western Balkans about the Czech debate on enlargement.

Only a few weeks are left until the end of this year, when the Czech Republic will assume the EU presidency for six months.

The message from senior policy makers in Prague concernin the Balkans was loud and clear:

“We are expecting your countries’ applications for membership during our presidency. We have been preparing to receive your applications for membership. We have coordinated with the government of Sweden (the second EU presidency in 2009) in order to be able to promote the cause of the Western Balkans. We are ready.”

Despite this clear message I left Prague feeling nervous. Listening to key foreign policy makers here it seemed as if, for practical reasons, the big window of opportunity in 2009 is closing for most of the Western Balkan states even before the year has begun. Countries in the region only have a few weeks left to get their act together if they want to keep alive their hope to graduate to candidate status in 2009.

Here are some of the basic facts leading to this sobering conclusion:

1. Applications

In order to become a candidate for EU membership a country must first submit a letter to the EU presidency that it actually wants to become a member. This is what Turkey did in 1987, Croatia in 2003, and Macedonia in 2004. Before this happens, nothing else, beyond an association agreement is possible. To do this with any chance of success, a country must obviously be recognised by all EU members as a state: this excludes Kosovo for the foreseeable future.

The historical record is that some EU countries will always try to discourage applications until applicants have made clear their determination and have made their case proactively based on a strong national consensus (I have written about this in an earlier blog on the gatecrasher principle). Montenegro might soon offer a good example of how to combine determination, focus and flexibility to arrive at a positive result – even when facing an initially sceptical (French) presidency.

2. A decision by the Council

Following the submission of a formal application by a given county the European Council needs to agree to to ask the European Commission to prepare an opinion on it (an avis).

Though it is always posssible for the EU council to refuse to do even this, in the case of the Western Balkan states such a step would send such a strongly negative signal that even the most sceptical EU members appear unwilling to do this. (Serbia’s case is different: without progress in bringing Ratko Mladic to The Hague the Dutch government would almost certainly block any further steps for now).

However, the agenda in early 2009 will be packed. Unless an application comes soon enough some EU countries might be tempted to postpone dealing with it for a few months.

There are two European Council meetings under the Czech presidency (and two under the Swedish presidency): the first two in March and June, the last in December.

In order to get all 27 countries to agree to ask the Commission to prepare an opinion on an application, weeks of preparation and consensus building might be necessary. As one senior Czech official told me: “We are prepared for and we would welcome having four applications from the Western Balkans on our table during our presidency.” But for a positive decision to be reached at the March Council an application would need to be submitted at least a few weeks beforehand, i.e. by January. Montenegrins have been aware of this constraint for a while.

3. The Questionnaire and the Commission Opinion

Following a request by the Council the Commission sends the applicant country a questionnaire with thousands of questions to be answered.

Even if the Commission does not delay this step and even if a country works hard on the questionnaire the whole process (Council asks Commission for an opinion; Commission sensdsa out the questionnaire; applicant country X completes it; Commission drafts an opinion) is expected to take at least six months.

Thus, if the European Council decides in March to task the Commission to draft an opinion, a realistic best case scenario is that this would be done in time for the last Council summit under the Swedish presidency in December. (An added complication are EU parliamentary elections and following this the formation of a new Commission in 2009).

The best case scenario already requires a lot of things to go well: if all countries of the Western Balkans submit their applications for membership within the first few weeks of 2009, and if the Czech presidency and other friendly member states convince fellow EU govenrments to task the Commission to study these applications; and if all the Balkan countries focus their energies on filling out the questionaires, and if they also succeed in addressing the major criticisms and concerns outlined already in the regular European Commission opinions; then the December 2009 European Council could grant all of them candidate status. December 2009 would then mirror the Helsinki summit of 1999, a major breakthrough for enlargement at the time.

This would be a strong and welcome message to the region, and to the world, that things are advancing in the Balkans. It would be all the more useful at a time of growing regional uncertainty, as to the impact of the world economic crisis on local economies and the deepening confusion over future EU policy in Kosovo. It would also send a strong signal in the wake of possible approval of the Lisbon Treaty by a second Irish referendum in 2009. Finally, it would be a fitting conclusion to the Swedish presidency, which has enlargement as one of its top priorities.

So far, so promising.

Speaking off the record, however, senior members of the Czech government and administration increasingly doubt that all of the countries of the region are likely to take the steps required to make this scenario even a theoretical possibility in 2009. As one stold us, “we are studying country by country to see where we can move things forward.”

What this incresingly means today is the following set of reduced ambitions:

to complete negotiations with Croatia in 2009;
to help “one country, perhaps two” obtain visa-free access for its citizens to the EU already in 2009: that country being Macedonia (the clear front-runner when it comes to fulfilling the conditions relating to visa free travel);
to help Montenegro get a positive decision at the March EU summit so that the Commission may start working on an opinion following an early Montenegrin application. Bosnia would be left behind, Albania’s next steps remain uncertain and Serbia is likely to loose more time as well.

Let me admit: I usually like to look at the bright side of things, to see opportunities even when they are small. There is still a small chance that the Western Balkans will finally wake up to the fact that 2009 is a real window of opportunity.

Perhaps a pending Montenegrin application would shake up confused and divided political establishments in Bosnia, Albania and Serbia and stir them into action?

This time around countries in the region cannot complain about the lack of positive and encouraging signals: the messages from Prague and Stockholm – and even from the Commission – have been clear. However, as seen from Prague in early December 2009, the main new question appears increasingly why Serbia, Bosnia and Albania find it so hard to take advantage of significant good will in both EU governments and EU institutions.

This, however, is an issue for another blog.

8 May 20087 August 2008

WDR Europaforum – How Europe looks from Ljubljana

Ljubljana is a fantastic place, it truly is. I have been here before but rarely has it struck me as forcefully as this time how pleasant the capital of Slovenia can be.

This was a short trip indeed, and I spent little more than 30 hours here, but there was no shortage of the most pleasant sensations: sitting in the evening near the main church in an outside cafe along the river, listening to a musician playing love songs on his guitar; walking through the old town in the early evening, up the hill to the medieval castle, to enjoy a view of the mountains that are so close to the city; listening to an orchestra performing classical music on a huge square in the middle of the old town; or simply eating Slovenian ham or Austrian rolls (Semmel) in the morning. All this makes life appear easy indeed: and the fairy-tale atmosphere of the old town compounds this sense of Lebensfreude. I had no profound thoughts here, except that sometimes it does not take much to be happy and to enjoy beauty and peace. And that this town is certainly worth coming back to for a slightly longer stay than this.

Of course, what added to Ljubljana’s charm on this special occasion was the fact that due to the Slovenian presidency – for a few months – this capital had become one of the centres of Europe. For this very reason the annual WDR Europaforum was held here, bringing an interesting mix of people to the medieval castle overlooking the town. Here they gathered, and from over-heared conversations it seemed that almost all were as impressed by the town as I was: there was Barroso, Poettering, the Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan, Kosovo’s new premier Hashim Thaci, prominent Slovenes (well, I knew two of them) and even more prominent Germans. WDR (part of the big ARD network, but in its own terms one of the biggest TV companies in the world) had turned the interior of the castle into a huge TV studio, to host its guests, thinking and debating the future of Europe.

Living in Istanbul, one often feels that there is little solid to hold on to, that the earth can shake (literally or politically) at any moment. This is even more true in this extraordinary spring. But is most of Europe today not more like Slovenia, from Portugal to Sweden and from Ireland to Estonia, than Turkey? Slovenia was part of a police state only two decades ago, embroiled in a bitter confrontation with Slobodan Milosevic. And today it is Slovenian diplomats chairing the gatherings of the European Council, speaking with confidence in the name of the hundreds of millions of EU citizens.

It is never good to be romantic in politics, and to some this may well appear a cliche, but in fact this is an extraordinary turn of events. And it is worth remembering that the overall trajectory of Europe since 1990 has been more like that of Slovenia than even an optimist could have expected then. So can one be anything but an optimist when one looks at the continent from the Slovenian capital, in itself one of the finest illustrations of the success of European enlargement?

(You can judge for yourself if I got carried away by the positive atmosphere, commenting on the challenges facing Europe today for WDR in the clip below.)
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1 May 200822 October 2008

The Adriatic push for enlargement. A view from Paris and Brussels

Kotor – View from St. Ivan’s Fortress, Montenegro		Tirana – Bulevardi Deshmoret e Kombit, Albania
Are Montenegro and Albania leading a new Adriatic push for EU enlargement in the Balkans in the coming months?

Montenegro is actively considering when to apply for EU membership and is likely to do so as early as May or June this year. The leader of the Albanian opposition, Edi Rama, has urged the Albanian government in a speech in Brussels this week to prepare such an application for September, offering the support of the opposition. Bosnia might well submit an application this year as well, a senior Bosnian official told ESI in Paris a few days ago. And Serbia, ESI has been told by the head of the Serbian Directorate for European integration, has been preparing to submit its application for EU membership for many years, only waiting for the signature of its Stabilisation and Association Agreement to proceed.

In recent days ESI asked leading Europeanizers, officials promoting the EU agenda in Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, about their plans for 2008. Their responses suggest that it is likely that this year all Western Balkan states who have not done so already will formally apply to become candidates to join the EU, under the Slovenian or under the French EU presidencies.

Some EU member states might find this a surprising development. However, this also offers the EU an opportunity to reaffirm European influence and secure stability at a moment when developments in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia are posing a potentially very serious threat to a successful EU common foreign policy in the Balkans.

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Gordana Djurovic on Montenegro’s path into the EU. © ESI

The Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, Gordana Djurovic told her colleagues from the other Balkan countries at an ESI event in Paris on 17 April that “the month of May is a nice time” for submitting an application for membership:

“Our European road is quite clear. Political and economic stability and good economic trends support the process. There is a strong political and national consensus regarding integration. So why not try to follow the reform process with the opening of new phase of integration?”

She notes that Montenegro will not be discouraged by signals from EU member states possibly urging it to slow down its progress:

“Becoming an EU member is not one act – it is a process. We talk about a very early phase. To submit the application is just to keep the EU door open for us. We will work hard after the decision.”

“We are now in an intensive process of communication. We have tried to share with our colleagues from EU member states our proposal, to explain our arguments and why we think it is the right time to submit an application. … Of course we have received some messages from the Slovenian side during their presidency. I am responsible for coordinating the European integration process in our Government. After all this communication, which will be finished at the end of April, I will write a paper and advise our political actors to decide about submitting the application as soon as possible.”

“In a constructive dialogue with EU member states during the past two months we tried to explain that time is also very valuable. Not only because of economic reasons but also because of political reasons. We tried to explain that, from our perspective, two years is quite a long period. We can finish a lot of European tasks in the meantime if we are allowed to continue …”

Edi Rama (Mayor of Tirana)

At another event in Brussels a few days later the leader of the Albanian opposition, Edi Rama, launched an appeal to the Albanian government to follow in the footsteps of Montenegro:

“Thanks to the fact that we have created a climate of cooperation, with the focus on NATO integration, we succeeded to come out with a very important result: the invitation to join NATO. On the other hand we realised the importance of conditionalities in this process, making the Albanian political class, the Albanian parliament, the Albanian government, aware of their own roles. I think from this experience of getting together, fulfilling our duties concerning justice reform and electoral reform, going together towards an objective, showing the will to find common ground as in all mature democratic countries, we have realized – and this is both my personal, but also a common conviction among the opposition – that we can do much more also in the EU integration process”

“So, I would like very much to make clear that we have enough reason to build upon this positive momentum reached by the invitation for NATO, and to go ahead with a new challenge of Europeanisation. This should really become the key word everywhere, in the country, but I very much believe also in the region. … This is not about favours, it is about real conditionality, which I think is very helpful to give a new push to the process of EU integration. In that respect, as the leader of the opposition, I believe that it is vital for the Albanian government to submit an application for EU membership by this autumn, September at the least. This is of course a sovereign decision, as it is a sovereign decision by the EU how to react. I strongly believe that this will really give us the opportunity to make this important re-assessment.”

“At the end of the day democracy is about how you disagree with each other. And the way of disagreeing gives quality or not to democratic life. We will continue to strongly disagree on domestic issues, but we will continue to push, as opposition, the government to take the risk, to be courageous and to go ahead with this application submission.”

Osman Topcagic

Osman Topcagic, the head of the Directorate of European integration, told ESI in Paris that Bosnia also needed to define for itself an ambitious objective:

“More Europe in the region means more stability, more economic prosperity more jobs – more employment that’s what we also need, so that is good. …

“What we have as our goal and officially defined in Parliament is to get candidate status by 2010. That would mean applying this year, so we still have not decided when exactly. Will it be during the Slovenian presidency, or in the second half of this year during the French presidency? I think we need to apply this year. We need to show good results, initial results in implementing SAA. To show that we have structures, we have good understanding of the Agreement, and there must be political will. That really is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all parties support the European integration process, and the public is very much in favour, 80 percent or more. So I am confident that we will submit an application before the end of the year, and then work hard to get Candidate status by 2010. That is another phase in this process, that is more encouragement for reform processes in Bosnia Herzegovina, and we know that we need to do much more in the next stages of this process but I am confident that we can do it. Other countries in our region did it, or are doing it, and we can do it.”

In the eyes of Osman Topcagic, one of the major advantages of European integration is that the process energizes the administration of a country. It brings new and qualified people to join the public sector:

“This is a really exciting process and many young people are attracted, I can tell you! We were recently in process of hiring 15 juniors and we had 600 applications, and it was really difficult to select the best of them. They wanted to work with us because we had such an image. People are attracted by our work, by the process itself, they want to be part of it, knowing in that way they can gain necessary experiences, but also they can advance in their career and career development”

Tanja Miscevic

Tanja Miscevic from Serbia outlined her hopes in Paris that the deadlock in Serbia related to the EU will finally be overcome in 2008:

“Immediately when we received the famous Feasibility Study at the beginning of April back in 2005 we started thinking not only about negotiating the Stabilisation and Association Agreement but about what would be the next steps? Immediately we reached the conclusion that the logical next step for us would be to apply for membership immediately after the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. And when we thought about the idea, we also had to think about those things that are necessary to be prepared in order to apply immediately for membership and candidate status.

She notes how important the progress of Serbia’s neighbours is for Serbia itself:

“I am really happy because of that, because that is for us a clear sign that there is a possibility, there is a road, and according to our merits, according to fulfilling the criteria we should, we also can apply. That is not a question anymore. … But somehow we are trapped in the non-existent political consensus in Serbia, not only about European integration but also about reforms, which is in fact the same as the process of European integration.”

Neven Pelicaric

All Western Balkan Europeanisers also draw inspiration from the experience of Croatia, as explained by Neven Pelicaric, Croatia’s Assistant Minister for Europe:

“It is a sovereign decision when the country and its political leaders and its people believe they are ready. It is up to them to set the timing. … We have been able to answer to 4,894 questions we have received. It took us or we were given 3.5 months to do so. There were of course some subsequent questions asked for clarification. And at the parliamentary session in Strasbourg in April 2004 we did receive a positive opinion (avis). Right up to the very last moment we were not sure, we knew it would be positive, but we were not sure if it was it was going to be conditional or not.”

“The Commissioner at the time, Chris Patten, was reading the recommendation and said “the Commission thereby recommends that Croatia be given Candidature status” – he moved his glasses up and looked up to the gallery and said “full stop”. That meant it was not going to be conditional and of course we were very happy about that”

“It looks like our process is now moving, and we see stronger activity in the working group for enlargement, in the Commission as well … . If everything goes well, we will move quicker in the French presidency, where we hope to open most, if not all of the chapters and close as many chapters as possible, for which we will be able to fulfill the conditions”

Video interviews

ESI took three top policy makers Osman Topcagic, Director for European integration for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tanja Miscevic, his counterpart from Serbia, and Neven Pelicaric, Croatia’s Assistant Minister for Europe to a café by the Pompidou Centre to talk through their EU integration strategies. Here you can listen to their assessments.

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Neven Pelicarić (Croatia), Osman Topčagić (Bosnia), and Tanja Miščević (Serbia) on how their countries prepare for EU accession. © ESI

Gordana Djurović is Montenegro’s Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration. She was the head of the negotiating team for negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Process, which was successfully completed with the signing of the agreement (SAA) on 15 October 2007. In the previous Government she was the Minister for International Economic Relations from February 2004 to October 2006. She is a Professor at the Faculty of Economics in Podgorica, where she teaches economic development, international economic relations and regional economics. She is also the head of post-graduate studies in European economic integration. Gordana Djurović is the author of more than fifty articles and a number of academic papers on economic development and European integration. Gordana Djurović obtained her Masters degree in 1991 at the Faculty of Economics in Podgorica, and in 1994 she obtained her PhD in the field of economic development planning in transition at the same Faculty.

Tanja Miščević is Director of the Serbian European Integration Office in Belgrade. Since 2001, she has also been the Director of the Department of European Studies of the G17 Institute in Belgrade. She initiated and organised the first programmes for training of civil servants on the functioning of the EU – the ABC of the European Union. Tanja Miščević has also lectured widely; as a Visiting Professor at the University of Bonn, at the Centre for European Integration, at the Diplomatic Academy of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Montenegro in Podgorica. She also teaches EU Accession Policy at the Postgraduate Studies Centre at the Faculty of Political Sciences (FPS) in Belgrade, where she was also awarded her Ph.D.

Neven Pelicarić is Assistant Minister at the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. He was previously Political Director – Division for Europe and the European Union, and from 2005-2006 he served as Ambassador-at-large. He was head of the Department for EU (Political) from 2004-2005. Ambassador Pelicarić is the head of the Working Group for Chapter XXXI on “Common Foreign, and Security Policy” as part of the EU accession process. He is co-editor of the book Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept.

Osman Topčagić is the Director of the Directorate for European Integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is the most senior civil servant in charge of European integration in Sarajevo. From 2002 to 2003, Osman Topčagić was Minister-Counsellor at the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU and to NATO in Brussels. He has also served as Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Kingdom. Read more about Osman Topčagić in ESI’s portrait section.

14 April 20088 August 2008

What Giuliano Amato told me in Rome

I travelled to Rome to meet Giuliano Amato, Italian Interior Minister, former Italian Prime minister and head of the International Commission on the Balkans until 2006. Since he spoke in English, and the whole interview is recorded, you can listen to one of Europe’s leading statesman with an interest in the region: why Montenegro can be taken for granted; why there is a need for a bold vision: that all the Balkans will join the EU by 2014; how Tirana has changed; and how fears of illegal migration feed into enlargement fatigue.

You find the whole interview here:

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5 April 20088 August 2008

Sleepless in Bucharest – Talking Balkans in Vienna

It was a stressful trip to Vienna, coming here straight from the Bucharest Nato summit, where I had slept through the unique chance of attending an early morning lecture by George Bush (having worked all night to complete and send out a discussion paper on Turkey’s Dark Side early in the morning). I sometimes enjoy conferences and among such events this Bucharest jamboree – a big conference organised by GMF always in parallel to the annual Nato summit – was certainly noteworthy for the prominence of its speakers. Then again, it helps having slept, or even the most interesting event can turn into a painful exercise of trying to stay awake (the worst thing about this event was the cameras zooming in on the audience and displaying their faces on huge screens hung up next to the speakers – this was NOT a conference that was kind to a secret nap in the last row),

Thus I noticed, on the way back from Bucharest, before dozing off on the plane, that there were really only three things that I took away from this rich event: I had had coffee with an old friend from Berlin, sneaking out of the conference centre (and skipping most of the session with the Afghan president). I had another occasion to marvel at Nato’s security operation, essentially closing off most of the streets in the Romanian capital so that guests were taken on empty roads around town. And I had a short but interesting chat with Wolfgang Ischinger, the Kosovo negotiator and German ambassador to London, sharing a taxi with him on the way to the airport. Efficient networking this was not …

My mood was not helped by the fact that my father had been hospitalised in Vienna due to a heart problem, which looked complicated, and had just been operated. But then in fact there was another urgent reason to come to Vienna, for what would otherwise have been a joyful occasion: to present – for the first time – the whole Balkanexpress – Return to Europe documentary film project to a broader audience.

The event, hosted by ORF, was well organised by Erste Foundation. Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer turned up, as did the CEOs of Erste Bank, OMV (the Austrian oil company), the Austrian National Broadcaster ORF and many others – a who-is-who of people interested in and involved in SEE in Vienna. The event became even more colourful as a result of the many guests from the region, including many members of the generation of Balkan change-lovers whom we featured in our films (you can see pictures of the event and who actually came here)

I delivered my introductory presentation. I had been uncertain until the last moment whether the trick of embedding video clips from the films into a power point presentation would actually work: it would be embarrassing to stand on a podium in front of all these august Austrians, having to improvise because the technology mixes up clips or the sound cannot be heared. I had prepared some lines to laugh away any mishap or confusion. But, when everything worked, I noted the usefulness of strong images. It is so much easier to move people emotionally when there is a moving picture.

Following the event, on the afternoon of the second day, I gave a little interview (see below). There is also a nice little trailer that sums up the whole atmosphere nicely.

Now we can only hope that TV audiences will also want to see the films. And that the films will soon be available also in English. I will keep you informed where and when you will be able to see them!

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18 January 200829 January 2008

Peddling ideas around Schuman II (Brussels in January: EPC)

…. continued from Peddling Ideas Around Schuman I (Brussels in January: Coweb)

EPC and the future of screening

Graham Avery Judy Batt Jacques Rupnik

Institutions like EPC are another fixture in the Brussels policy landscape. I have come here quite often in the past, for debates and presentations. Last year I was invited to join EPC’s international advisory board. This time the occasion to come was the ECP “task force” on the Balkans.

EPC is, to those not familiar with Brussels, the equivalent of an intellectual club for Brussels policy-makers: they can come to listen to arguments and debates without really having to leave their offices (the Residence Palace, where EPC is based, is right across the road from all the main EU buildings). But EPC also aims to generate ideas. This is why a small group of Balkan experts had been invited to come together a few times this year and debate. Chaired by Graham Avery, some 10 experts took up the offer.

Again Alex and myself distributed our most recent reports. Again we tried to challenge some conventional wisdoms about the Balkans (particularly about Bosnia this time). And once again we had a specific proposal which we sought to put up for debate: the notion that screening for all the countries of the Western Balkans should begin later this year, even before the start of full accession negotiations. For details on this proposal see my next entry on Rumeli Observer; let me make a more general point about the spreading of policy ideas here.

My first observation: policy proposals are often most effective when their origin is forgotten. One of the attributes of a successful think tank is not to be possessive about “ideas”: the more an idea, analysis or policy proposal becomes part of a new “received wisdom” the more likely it is to be adopted. A policy proposal for real change needs to become part of a new consensus. For this to happen the gatekeepers in public policy debates (journalists and policy analysts) need to find it convincing.

The EPC meeting was a gathering of such gatekeepers. There are others in other places. In fact, like a wandering circus, seminars and conferences on the Balkans take place across Europe every few weeks (or more). I sometimes wonder why “the future of Kosovo” needs to be discussed by a similar crowd of people every other month in another European holiday destination (Paris, Athens, Rome, Vienna ….). However, in the end the intellectual activity that takes place (or does not) at these events matters. This is true for better or worse: when such meetings generate no ideas, or the wrong ones, the consequences will also usually be felt before long …

Compared with other sumptious gathering this EPC task force meeting is a frugal affair. A small group, exchanging ideas over sandwiches, with the vague notion to “contribute to the debate” on the future of EU policy. What exactly we would contribute is left open, it is only agreed that there would be some paper at the end, still to be determined. Participants prepare presentations for each other and then discuss them. I volunteer for a presentation in February on lessons for the Western Balkans from the Eastern Balkans.

Who are the members of this group? There is the chair, a former senior commission official in charge of enlargement, Graham Avery. There is Judy Batt (now based in Paris), Jacques Rupnik (from Paris), Tim Judah (based in London), and others. These are all familiar faces. I had recently met Jacques in Tirana at the Albanian ambassador’s conference (see The gate-crashing principle), Judy in Belgrade a few months ago and Tim in Pristina. I narrowly missed him at an event in Georgia, and would have seen him at another event in DC next February, if I would have accepted the invitation. This indicates the nature of this loose network of Balkan watchers: as a group, people who work on the Balkans in policy institutes across Europe probably meet at least as often as their political counterparts from European foreign ministries. And like them, the thing they do is talk.

Does this kind of talk matter? There are many bad conferences, badly prepared speakers, repetitive moments at conferences around Europe. However, listening to Jacques explain the latest thinking in France about the future of enlargement, hearing Tim’s first hand information about his latest encounters with diplomats and politicians in Belgrade, learning from Judy about whatever her latest trip to the region revealed about the mood in Belgrade or Podgorica is always of enormous benefit. So is seeing their reactions to concrete ESI proposals.

What does Lajcak really want to achieve in Bosnia? (Judy has become one of his outside advisors). What is Tim’s latest impression of the political dynamics in Belgrade? (where Tim goes all the time). How genuine is the new French rhetoric about enlargement? (Jacques explains that it is real, having discussed this on a panel recently with the Minister for Europe in Paris, Jean-Pierre Jouyet). How might the idea of an early screening in the Western Balkans be received by the Commission? (I note with relief that Graham Avery finds the idea interesting). Etc …

Malcolm Gladwell has written about the “law of the few” in the spreading of ideas, distinguishing between connectors, mavens and salesmen. Connectors are people who know lots of people. Salesmen are those “with the skills to persuade us when we are unconvinced of what we are hearing.” Mavens (a Yiddish word which, Gladwell tells us, means one who accumulates knowledge) are people “who read more magazines than the rest of us, more newspapers, and they may be the only people who read junk mail”:

“What sets Mavens apart, though, is not so much what they know but how they pass it along. The fact that Mavens want to help, for no other reason than because they like to help, turns out to be an awfully effective way of getting someone’s attention.”

Mavens are “really information brokers, sharing and trading what they know.” This is perhaps the best way to describe this EPC meeting: as a gathering of Balkan mavens.

Connectors in Brussels

L. Keith Gardiner notes in an article written in 1989 (Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects) that policy analysis “cannot serve if it does not know the doer’s minds; it cannot serve if it does not have their confidence.” He also writes that

“most policy-makers probably would welcome analysis that helps them to develop a sound picture of the world, to list the possible ways to achieve their action goals, and to influence others to accept their visions.”

This calls for “colorful, anecdotal language”:

“analysts strongly prefer to transmit knowledge through writing, because only writing can capture the full complexity of what they want to convey. Policy consumers, however, tend to seek what can be called “news” rather than knowledge; they are more comfortable with a mode of communication that more closely resembles speech.”

This, then, is the third reason to come to Brussels (and do so regularly): one-on-one meetings with EU officials, with friends, like Heather Grabbe, from the cabinet of Olli Rehn, who is in charge of Turkey; old friends like Michael Giffoni, now heading the Balkan department in the Council (we worked together in Bosnia almost a decade ago). The Balkan team in the Slovenian permanent representation in Brussels. Ben Crampton, working on Kosovo in the council, another old hand from the Balkans (whose father, one of the leading historians on South East Europe, I had known in Oxford). Stefan Lehne, the director for the Balkans and East Europe in the EU Council …

Until the next trip …

The fourth task, finally, is the real bread and butter of our work, without which there would be nothing to share, no ideas to present, and no reputation to open any doors: sitting and grappling with the draft of future ESI reports with Alex. Sitting in her apartment in Ixelles we prepare a short intervention for the upcoming debate on the future mandate of the OHR (which will be discussed at the PIC at the end of February). We discuss the Austrian debate on Turkey (a report which has been depressing me for a few months now). We talk through in detail our upcoming report on the German debate on Turkey. And then there is another amitious report on Central Bosnia to finish ….

In the end the whole trip to Brussels lasts a mere three days. As I leave a new long list of dates has been fixed which imply coming to Brussels: a presentation in February to the EPC taks force; a presentation of the Balkan film project with the Slovenes; a presentation on energy policy in the Balkans at EPC; a meeting with Olli Rehn; another one with Javier Solana; a brainstorming with Peter Feith, the future head of the International Mission in Kosovo, and his senior team. Thus the cycle of trips to the European capital never ends …